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Abstract
We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each
player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egali-
tarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much
higher rewards than the maximin value of both players. Our most important con-
tribution is the derivation of an algorithm that achieves simultaneously, for both
players, a high-probability regret bound of order O
´
3
?
lnT ¨ T 2{3
¯
after any T
rounds of play. We demonstrate that our upper bound is nearly optimal by proving
a lower bound of Ω
`
T 2{3
˘
for any algorithm.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems are ubiquitous in many real life applications such as self-driving cars, games,
computer networks, etc. Agents acting in such systems are usually self-interested and aim to max-
imize their own individual utility. To achieve their best utility, agents face three key fundamental
questions: exploit, cooperate, or insure safety? Learning how agents should behave when faced
with these significant challenges is the subject of this paper. We focus on two players (one is called
agent, the other opponent) repeated games, a setting which captures the key challenges faced when
interacting in a multi-agent system where at each round, the players simultaneously select an action
and observe an individual numerical value called reward. The goal of each player in this game, is to
maximize the sum of accumulated rewards over many rounds. One of the key dilemmas for learning
in repeated games is the lack of a single optimal behavior that is satisfactory against all opponents,
since the best strategy necessarily depends on the opponent.
Powers et al. [24] tackle this dilemma and propose a rigorous criterion called guarded optimality
which for two players simplifies to three criteria: (1) Targeted Optimality: when the opponent is a
member of the target set, the average reward is close to the best response against that opponent; (2)
Safety: against any opponent, the average reward is close to a safety value; (3) Individual Rationality:
in self-play, the average reward is Pareto efficient1 and individually not below the safety value.
In this paper, we adopt those criteria and focus on the self-play settings. We pick the safety value to
be the largest value one can guarantee against any opponent (also called maximin value, see Defini-
tion 5). For the individual rationality criterion, we depart from previous works by considering the
so called egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) [17] in which both players bargain to get an equal
amount above their maximin value. This EBS is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the repeated game,
a direct consequence of the folk theorems [22] and in many games (see Example 1) has a value
typically no worse for both players than values achievable by single-stage (i.e. non-repeated) NE
1i.e., it is impossible for one agent to change to a better policy without making the other agent worse off.
Preprint. Under review.
usually considered in the literature. We pick the EBS since it satisfies even more desirable properties
[17] on top of the individual rationality criterion such as: independence of irrelevant alternatives (i.e.
eliminating choices that were irrelevant does not change the choices of the agents), individual mono-
tonicity (a player with better options should get a weakly-better value) and (importantly) uniqueness.
It is also connected to fairness and Rawls [26] theory of justice for human society [17].
Related work Our work is related to Munoz de Cote and Littman [19] where an algorithm to find
the same egalitarian solution for general-sum repeated stochastic games is provided. When applied
to general-sum repeated games, their algorithm implies finding an approximate solution using a
(binary) search through the space of policy. Instead, our result will find the exact egalitarian solution
with a more direct and simple formula. Also Munoz de Cote and Littman [19] and many other works
such as [7, 18, 24] assume deterministic rewards known to both players. In this work, we consider
the case of stochastic rewards generated from a fixed distribution unknown by both players.
Another difference with many previous works is the type of solution considered in self-play. Indeed,
we consider a NE for the repeated game whereas works such as [3, 7, 8, 23] consider the single-stage
NE. The single-stage NE is typically undesirable in self-play since equilibrium with much higher
values can be achieved as illustrated by Example 1 in this paper. Other works such as [24] consider
optimizing for the sum of rewards in self-play. However, as illustrated by Example 1 in this paper,
this sum of rewards does not always guarantee individual rationality since some player could get
lower than their maximin.
Crandall and Goodrich [9], Stimpson and Goodrich [27] proposes algorithms with the goal of con-
verging to a NE of the repeated games. However, [9] only show an asymptotic convergence empiri-
cally in a few games while [27] only show that some parameters of their algorithms are more likely
to converge asymptotically. Instead, we provide finite-time theoretical guarantees for our algorithm.
Although in their settings players only observe their own rewards and not the other player, they
assume deterministic rewards.
Brafman and Tennenholtz [5], Wei et al. [28] tackles online learning for a generalization of repeated
games called stochastic games. However, they consider zero-sum games where the sum of the
rewards of both players for any joint-action is always 0. In our case, we look at the general sum
case where no such restrictions are placed on the rewards. In the learning settings there are other
single-stage equilibrium considered such as correlated-equilibrium [13].
Our work is also related to multi-objective multi-armed bandit [11] by considering the joint-actions
as arms controlled by a single-player. Typical work consider on multi-objective multi-armed bandit
tries to find any solution that minimizes the distance between the Pareto frontier. However, not all
Pareto efficient solutions are acceptable as illustrated by Example 1 in this paper. Instead, our work
show that a specific Pareto efficient (the egalitarian) is more desirable.
Paper organization The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents formally our setting,
assumptions, as well key definitions needed to understand the remainder of the paper. Section 3
shows a description of our algorithm while section 4 contains its analysis as well as the lower bound.
We conclude in section 5 with indication about future works. Detailed proof of our theorems is
available in the appendix.
2 Background and Problem Statement
We focus on two-player general sum repeated games. At round t, both players select and play a joint
action at “ pait, a´it q from a finite setA “ AiˆA´i. Then, they receive rewards prit, r´it q P r0, 1s2
generated from a fixed but unknown bounded distribution depending on their joint action. The
actions and rewards are then revealed to both players. We assume the first agent to be under our
control and the second agent to be the opponent. We would like to design algorithms such that our
agent’s cumulative rewards are as high as possible. The opponent can have one of two types known
to our agent: (1) self-player (another independently run version of our algorithm) or (2) arbitrary
(i.e any possible opponents with no access to the agent’s internal randomness).
To measure performance, we compare our agent to an oracle that has full knowledge of the distri-
bution of rewards for all joint-actions. The oracle then plays like this: (1) in self-play, they both
2
compute before the game start the egalitarian equilibrium and play it; (2) against any other arbitrary
opponent, the oracle plays the policy ensuring the maximin value.
Our goal is to design algorithms that have low expected regret against this oracle after any number
of T rounds, where regret is the difference between the value that the oracle would have obtained
and the value that our algorithm actually obtained. Next, we formally define the terms that describe
our problem setting.
Definition 1 (Policy). A policy πi in a repeated game for player i is a mapping from each possible
history to a distribution over its actions. That is: @t ě 0, πi : Ht Ñ ∆Ai where t is the current
round andHt is the set of all possible history of joint-actions up to round t.
A policy is called stationary if it plays the same distribution at each round. It is called deterministic
stationary if it plays the same action at each round.
Definition 2 (Joint-Policy). A joint policy pπi, π´iq is a pair of policies, one for each player i,´i
in the game. In particular, this means that the probability distributions over actions of both players
are independent. When each component policy is stationary, we call the resulting policy stationary
and similarly for deterministic stationary.
Definition 3 (Correlated-Policy). Any joint-policy where player actions are not independent is cor-
related2. A correlated policy π specifies a probability distribution over joint-actions known by both
players: @t ě 0, π : Ht Ñ ∆A.
In this paper, when we refer to a policy π without any qualifier, we will mean a correlated-policy,
which is required for the egalitarian solution. When we refer to πi and pπi, π´iq we will mean the
components of a non-correlated joint-policy.
2.1 Solution concepts
In this section, we explain the two solution concepts we aim to address: safety–selected as the
maximin value and individual rationality selected as achieving the value of the EBS. We start from
the definition of a value for a policy.
Definition 4 (Value of a policy). The value V ipπq of a policy π for player i in a repeated gameM
is defined as the infinite horizon undiscounted expected average reward given by:
V iM pπq “ lim sup
TÑ8
1
T
E
˜
Tÿ
t“1
rit
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ π,M
¸
.
We use VM “ pV iM , V ´iM q to denote values for both players and dropM when clear from the context.
Definition 5 (Maximin value). The maximin policy πi
SV
for player i and its value SV i are such that:
πi
SV
“ argmax
πi
min
π´i
V ipπi, π´iq, SV i “ max
πi
min
π´i
V ipπi, π´iq.
where V ipπi, π´iq is the value for player i playing policy πi while all other players play π´i.
Definition 6 (Advantage game and Advantage value). Consider a repeated game between two play-
ers i and ´i defined by the joint-actions A “ Ai ˆ A´i and the random rewards r drawn from a
distribution R : A Ñ ∆R2. Let SV “ pSV i, SV ´iq be the maximin value of the two players. The
advantage game is the game with (random) rewards r` obtained by subtracting the maximin value
of the players from r. More precisely, the advantage game is defined by: r`paq “ rpaq´SV @a P A.
The value of any policy in this advantage game is called advantage value.
Definition 7 (EBS in repeated games). Consider a repeated game between two players i and´iwith
maximin value SV “ pSV i, SV ´iq. A policy πEg is an EBS if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) it belongs to the set ΠEg of policies maximizing the minimum of the advantage value for both
players. (2) it maximizes the value of the player with highest advantage value.
More formally, for any vector x “ px1, x2q P R2, let L : R2 Ñ R2 be a permutation of x such that
L1pxq ď L2pxq. Let’s define a lexicographic maximin ordering ěℓ on R2 as:
xěℓ y ðñ
`
L1pxq ą L1pyq˘_ `L1pxq “ L1pyq ^ L2pxq ě L2pyq˘ for any x P R2, y P R2
2For example through a public signal.
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A policy πEg is an EBS
3 if: V pπEgq ´ SV ěℓ V pπq ´ SV @π
We call EBS value the value VEg “ V pπEgq and V`pπEgq “ V pπEgq ´ SV will be used to designate
the egalitarian advantage.
2.2 Performance criteria
We can now define precisely the two criteria we aim to optimize.
Definition 8 (Safety Regret). The safety regret for an algorithm Λ playing for T rounds as agent i
against an arbitrary opponent π´i with no knowledge of the internal randomness of Λ is defined by:
RegretT pΛ, π´iq “
Tÿ
t“1
SV i ´ rit
Definition 9 (Individual Rational Regret). The individual rational regret for an algorithmΛ playing
for T rounds as agent i against its self Λ1 identified as ´i is defined by:
RegretT pΛ,Λ1q “ max
#
Tÿ
t“1
V i
Eg
´ rit,
Tÿ
t“1
V ´i
Eg
´ r´it
+
Example 1 (Comparison of the EBS value to other concepts). In Table 1, we present a game and
give the values achieved by the single-stageNE, and Correlated Equilibrium [13] (Correlated); maxi-
mizing the sum of rewards (Sum), and a Pareto-efficient solution (Pareto). In this game, the maximin
value is p 3
10
, 3
10
q. Sum leads to 1
10
for the first player, much lower than its maximin. Pareto is also
similarly problematic. Consequently, it is not enough to converge to any Pareto solution since that
does not necessarily guarantee rationality for both players. Both NE and Correlated fail to give the
players a value higher than their maximin while the EBS shows that a high value p23
25
, 23
25
q is achiev-
able. A conclusion similar to this example can also be made for all non trivial zero-sum games.
C D
C 4
5
, 4
5
1
10
, 9
5
D 9
5
, 0 3
10
, 3
10
(a) Game
Maximin Egalitarian Nash Sum Correlated Pareto
3
10
, 3
10
23
25
, 23
25
3
10
, 3
10
1
10
, 9
5
3
10
, 3
10
9
5
, 0
(b) Comparison of solutions
Table 1: Comparison of the EBS to others concepts
3 Methods Description
Generic structure Before we detail the safe and individual rational algorithms, we will describe
their general structure. The key challenge is how to deal with uncertainty, the fact that we do not
know the rewards. To deal with this uncertainty, we use the standard principle of optimism in the
face of uncertainty [16]. It works by a) constructing a set of statistically plausible games containing
the true game with high probability through a confidence region around estimated mean rewards, a
step detailed in section 3.1; b) finding within that set of plausible games the one whose EBS policy
(called optimistic) has the highest value, a step detailed in section 3.2; c) playing this optimistic
policy until the start of an artificial epoch where a new epoch starts when the number of times any
joint-action has been played is doubled (also known as the doubling trick), a step described in Jaksch
et al. [16] and summarized by Algorithm 3 in Appendix G.
3.1 Construction of the plausible set
At epoch k, our construction is based on creating a set Mk containing all possible games with
expected rewards E r such that,
Mk “ tr : |E ripaq ´ r¯ikpaq| ď Ckpaq@i, au, Ckpaq “
d
2 ln 1{δk
Ntkpaq
, (1)
3Also corresponds to the leximin solution to the Bargaining problem [4].
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whereNtkpaq is the number of times action a has been played up to round tk, r¯kpaq is the empirical
mean reward observed up to round tk and δk is an adjustable probability. The plausible set can be
used to define the following upper and lower bounds on the rewards of the game:
rˆikpaq “ r¯ikpaq ` Ckpaq, rˇikpaq “ r¯ikpaq ´ Ckpaq.
We denote Mˆ the game with rewards rˆ and Mˇ the game with rˇ. Values in those two games are resp.
denoted Vˆ , Vˇ . We used Ckpπq, Ckpπi, π´iq to refer to the bounds obtained by a weighted (using π)
average of the bounds for individual action. When clear from context, the subscript k is dropped.
3.2 Optimistic EBS policy
§1 Problem formulation Our goal is to find a game M˜k and a policy π˜k whose EBS value is
near-optimal simultaneously for both players. In particular, if we refer to the true but unknown game
byM and assume thatM PMk we want to find M˜k and π˜k such that:
VM˜kpπ˜kqěℓ VM 1pπ1q @π1,M 1 PMk | Pr
 
VM 1pπ1q ě VM pπEgq ´ pǫk, ǫkq
( “ 1 (2)
where ěℓ is defined in Definition 7 and ǫk a small configurable error.
Note that the condition in (2) is required (contrarily to single-agent games [16]) since in general,
there might not exist a game in Mk that achieves the highest EBS value simultaneously for both
players. For example, one can construct a case where the plausible set contains two games with EBS
value (resp) p1
2
` ǫ, 1
2
` ǫq and p1
2
, 1q for any 0 ă ǫ ă 1 (See Table 2 in Appendix E). This makes the
optimization problem (2) significantly more challenging than for single-agent games since a small
ǫ error in the rewards can lead to a large (linear) regret for one of the player. This is also the root
cause for why the best possible regret becomes ΩpT 2{3q rather than Ωp?T q typical for single agent
games. We refer the this challenge as the small ǫ-error large regret issue.
§2 Solution To solve (2), a) we set the optimistic game M˜k as the game Mˆ in Mk with the
highest rewards rˆ for both players. Indeed, for any policy π1 and gameM 1 PMk, one can always
get a better value for both players by using Mˆ ; b) we compute an advantage game corresponding
to M˜k by estimating an optimistic maximin value for both players, a step detailed in paragraph
§3; c) we compute in paragraph §4 an EBS policy π˜k,Eg using the advantage game; d) we set the
policy π˜k to be π˜k,Eg unless one of three conditions explained in paragraph §5 happens. Algorithm 2
details the steps to compute π˜k and to correlate the policy, players play the joint-action minimizing
their observed frequency of played actions compared to π˜k (See function PLAYp) of Algorithm 3 in
Appendix G).
§3 Optimistic Maximin Computation Satisfying (2) implies we need to find a value SVˇ with:
SV i ´ ǫk ď SVˇ i ď SV i ` ǫk @i (3)
where SV i is the maximin value of player i in the true gameM . To do so, we return a lower bound
value for the optimistic maximin policy πˆiSVk of player i. We begin by computing in polynomial
time4 the (stationary) maximin policy for the game Mˆ with largest rewards. We then compute the
(deterministic, stationary) best response policy πˇ´i
SVˆ
using the game Mˇ with the lowest rewards. The
detailed steps are available in Algorithm 1. This results in a lower bound on the maximin value
satisfying (3) as proven in Lemma 1.
§4 Computing an EBS policy. Armed with the optimistic game and the optimistic maximin
value, we can now easily compute the corresponding optimistic advantage game whose rewards
are denoted by rˆ`. An EBS policy π˜k,Eg is computed using this advantage game. The key insight
to do so is that the EBS involves playing a single deterministic stationary policy or combine two
deterministic stationary policies (Proposition 1). Given that the number of actions is finite we can
then just loop through each pairs of joint-actions and check which one gives the best EBS score. The
score (justified in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C.4.) to use for any two joint-actions a
4For example by using linear programming [1, 10].
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Algorithm 1 Optimistic Maximin Policy Computation
1: function OPTMAXIMIN(r¯, rˆ, rˇ.)
2: Calculate i’s optimistic policy: πˆiSVk “ argmaxπi minπ´i Vˆ ipπi, π´iq
3: Find the best response: πˇ´i
SVˆk
“ argminπ´i Vˇ ipπˆiSVk , π´iq
4: Get a lower bound on the maximin value: SVˇ ik “ minπ´i Vˇ ipπˆiSVk , π´iq “ Vˇ ipπˆiSVk , πˇ´iS˜V q
5: return π˜iSVk , πˇ
´i
˜SVk
, SVˇ ik
6: end function
and a1 is: scorepa, a1q “ miniPt1,2uwpa, a1q ¨ rˆi`paq ` p1´ wpa, a1qq ¨ ri`pa1q with w as follows:
wpa, a1q “
$’’&
’’%
0, if rˆi`paq ď rˆ´i` paq and rˆi`pa1q ď rˆ´i` pa1q
1, if rˆi`paq ě rˆ´i` paq and rˆi`pa1q ě rˆ´i` pa1q
rˆ
´i
` pa1q´rˆi`pa1q
prˆi`paq´rˆi`pa1qq`prˆ´i` pa1q´rˆ´i` paqq , otherwise
(4)
And the policy π˜k,Eg is such that
π˜k,EgpaEgq “ wpaEg, a1Egq; π˜k,Egpa1Egq “ 1´wpaEg, a1Egq; aEg, a1Eg “ argmax
aPA,a1PA
scorepa, a1q (5)
§5 Policy Execution We always play the optimistic EBS policy π˜k,Eg unless one of the following
three events happens:
• The probable error on the maximin value of one player is too large. Indeed, the error on
the maximin value can become too large if the weighted bound on the actions played by
the maximin policies is too large. In that case, we play the action causing the largest error.
• The small ǫ-error large regret issue is probable: Proposition 2 implies that the small ǫ-error
large regret issue may only happen if the player with the lowest ideal advantage value
(the maximum advantage under the condition that the advantage of the other player is non-
negative) is receiving it when playing an EBS policy. This allows Algorithm 2 to check
for this player and plays the action corresponding to its ideal advantage as far as the other
player is still receiving ǫk-close to its EBS value (Line 4 to 13 in Algorithm 2).
• The probable error on the EBS value of one player is too large This only happens if we
keep not playing the EBS policy due to the small ǫ-error large regret issue. In that case,
the error on the EBS value used to detect the small ǫ-error large regret issue might become
too large making the check for the small ǫ-error large regret issue irrelevant. In that case,
we play the action of the EBS policy responsible for the largest error.
4 Theoretical analysis
Before we present theoretical analysis for the learning algorithm, we discuss the existence and
uniqueness of the EBS value, as well as the type of policies that can achieve it.
Properties of the EBS Fact 1 allows us to restrict our attention to stationary policies since it
means that any (optimal) value achievable can be achieved by a stationary (correlated-) policy and
Fact 2 means that the egalitarian always exists and is unique providing us with a good benchmark to
compare against. Fact 1 and 2 are resp. justified in Appendix C.1 and C.2.
Fact 1 (Achievable values for both players). Any achievable value V “ pV i, V ´iq for the players
can be achieved by a stationary correlated-policy.
Fact 2 (Existence and Uniqueness of the EBS value for stationary policies). If we are restricted to
the set of stationary policies, then the EBS value defined in Definition 7 exists and is unique.
The following Proposition 1 strengthens the observation in Fact 1 and establishes that a weighted
combination of at most two joint-actions can achieve the EBS value. This allows for an efficient
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Algorithm 2 Optimistic EBS Policy Computation
1: function OPTIMISTICEGALITARIANPOLICY(r¯, rˆ, rˇ)
2: πˆiSVk , πˇ
´i
SVk
, SVˇ ik “ OPTMAXIMIN(r¯, rˆ, rˇ.) and rˆi`paq “ rˆipaq ´ SVˆ i
3: Compute the EBS policy πˆk,Eg using (5) and rˆ
i
`; Let πˆk Ð πˆk,Eg
4: (@i, from the set of actions with positive advantage ǫtk close to the EBS value of ´i, find
the one maximizing i advantage)
A˜i “ ta | rˆi`paq ` ǫtk ě Vˆ i`pπˆk,Egq ^ rˆi`paq ě 0u @i P t1, 2u
aˆi “ argmax
aPA˜´i
rˆi`paq @i P t1, 2u
5: (Look for the players i whose advantage for action aˆi is larger than the EBS value of i )
P˜ “ ti P t1, 2u | rˆi`paˆiq ą Vˆ i`pπˆk,Egqu
6: (If there is a player whose advantage is better than the one for the EBS policy, play it)
7: if P˜ ‰ ∅ then
8: p˜ “ argmaxiPP˜ rˆi`paˆiq , πˆk Ð aˆp˜
9: end if
10: (If potential errors on the EBS value is too large, play the responsible action.)
11: if 2Cpπˆk,Egq ą ǫtk then
12: Let aˆk,Eg “ argmaxaPA|Ctk paqąǫtk πˆk,Egpaq , πˆk Ð aˆk,Eg
13: end if
14: (If potential errors on the maximin value is too large, play the responsible action.)
15: if 2CpπˆiSVk , πˇ´iSVkq ą ǫtk then
16: Let aˆSVk “ argmaxaPA|Ctk paqąǫtk πˆ
i
SVk
paq ¨ πˇ´iSVkpaq , πˆk Ð aˆSVk
17: end if
18: return πˆk
19: end function
algorithm that can just loop through all possible pairs of joint-actions and check for the best one.
However, given any two joint-actions one still needs to know how to combine them to get an EBS
value. This question is answered by proposition 2.
Proposition 1 (On the form of an EBS policy). Given any 2 player repeated game, the EBS value
can always be achieved by a stationary policy with non-zero probability on at most two joint-actions.
Sketch. We follow the same line of reasoning used in [18] by showing that the EBS value lies on the
outer boundary of the convex hull introduced in the proof of Fact 1. This immediately implies the
proposition. Details are available in Appendix C.3.
Proposition 2 (Finding an EBS policy). Let us call the ideal advantage value V i`I of a player i, the
maximum advantage that this player can achieve under the restriction that the advantage value of
the other player is non-negative. More formally: V i`I “ maxπ|V ´i` pπqě0 V
i
`pπq. The egalitarian
advantage value for the two players is exactly the same unless there exists an EBS policy that is
deterministic stationary where at least one player (necessarily including the player with the lowest
ideal advantage value) is receiving its ideal advantage value.
Sketch. Since there is an EBS policy playing only two joint-actions (by Proposition 1), we show how
to optimally combine any two joint-actions. The proposition then follows directly. More details is
available in Appendix C.4
Regret Analysis The following theorem 1 gives us a high probability upper bound on the regret
in self-play against the EBS value, a result achieved without the knowledge of T .
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Theorem 1 (Individual Rational Regret for Algorithm 3 in self-play). After running Algorithm 3 in
self play with δtk “ δk¨tk and ǫtk “ 2 ¨
´
|A| ln tk
tk
¯1{3
for any rounds T ě |A|, with probability at
least 1´ δ4
3T
, the individual rational regret (definition 9 ) for each player is upper bounded as:
RegretT ď |A|2 log2
ˆ
8T
|A|
˙
` 12 3
a
|A| lnT ¨ T 2{3 ` 2
d
2 ln
|A|T log2
8T
|A|
δ
p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T
` 2
ba
T |A|` 6`
d
T
2
¨ ln
ˆ
T
δ4
¨ 45
99.375´ π4
˙
ď O
´
12 3
a
|A| lnT ¨ T 2{3
¯
Sketch. The structure of the proof follows that of [16]. The key step is to prove that the value
of policy π˜k returned by Algorithm 2 in our plausible set is ǫ-close to the EBS value in the true
model (optimism). In our case, we cannot always guarantee this optimism. Our proof identifies the
concerned cases and show that they cannot happen too often (Lemma 4 in Appendix B.1). Then for
the remaining cases, Lemma 3 shows that we can guarantee the optimism with an error of 4ǫtk . The
step-by-step detailed proof is available in Appendix B.1.
By definition of EBS, Theorem 1 also applies to the safety regret. However in Theorem 2, we show
that the optimistic maximin policy enjoys near-optimal safety regret of Op?T q.
Theorem 2 (Safety Regret of policy π˜iSVk in Algorithm 1). Consider a safe algorithm for player i
obtained by playing the policy π˜iSVk with δtk “ δk¨tk . After any rounds T ě |A| against any opponent,
then with probability at least 1 ´ δ4
3T
, the safe regret (definition 8) of this policy is upper-bounded
by:
RegretT ď
d
8 ln
|A|T log2
8T
|A|
δ
p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T `
b
4
?
TA` 6`
d
2T ln
ˆ
T
δ4
¨ 90
99.375´ π4
˙
Sketch. The proof works similarly to that of Theorem 1 by observing that here we can always
guarantee optimism. A more detailed proof is available in Appendix D.
Lower bounds for the individual rational regret Here we establish a lower bound of Ω
`
T 2{3
˘
for any algorithm trying to learn the EBS value. This shows that our upper bound is optimal up to
logarithm-factors. The key idea in proving this lower bound is the example illustrated by Table 2.
In that example, the rewards of the first player are all 1
2
and the second player has an ideal value
of 1. However, 50% of the times a player cannot realize its ideal value due to an ǫ-increase in a
single joint-action for both players. The main intuition behind the proof of the lower bound is that
any algorithm that wants to minimize regret can only try two things (a) detect whether there exists
a joint-action with an ǫ or if all rewards of the first player are equal. (b) always ensure the ideal
value of the second player. To achieve (a) any algorithm needs to play all joint-actions for 1
ǫ2
times.
Picking ǫ “ T´1{3 ensures the desired lower bound. The same ǫ would also ensure the same lower
bound for an algorithm targeting only (b). Appendix E formally proves this lower bound.
Theorem 3 (Lower bounds). For any algorithm Λ, any natural numbers |A1| ě 2, |A2| ě 2,
T ě |A1| ˆ |A2|, there is a general sum game with |A| “ |A1| ˆ |A2| joint-actions such that the
expected individual rational regret of Λ after T steps is at least Ω
´
T 2{3 |A|
1{3
4
¯
.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we illustrated a situation in which typical solutions for self-play in repeated games,
such as single-stage equilibrium or sum of rewards, are not appropriate. We propose the usage of
an egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) which guarantees each player to receive no less than their
maximin value. We analyze the properties of EBS for repeated games with stochastic rewards and
derive an algorithm that achieves a near-optimal finite-time regret ofOpT 2{3q with high probability.
We are able to conclude that the proposed algorithm is near-optimal, since we prove a matching lower
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bound up to logarithmic-factor. Although our results imply a OpT 2{3q safety regret (i.e. compared
to the maximin value), we also show that a component of our algorithm guarantees the near-optimal
Op?T q safety regret against arbitrary opponents.
Our work illustrates an interesting property of the EBS which is: it can be achieved with sub-linear
regret by two individually rational agents who are uncertain about their utility. We wonder if other
solutions to the Bargaining Problem such as the Nash Bargaining Solution or the Kalai–Smorodinsky
Solution also admit the same property. Since the EBS is an equilibrium, another intriguing question
is whether one can design an algorithm that converges naturally to the EBS solution against some
well-defined class of opponents.
Finally, a natural and interesting future direction for our work is its extension to stateful games such
as Markov games.
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A Notations and terminology
We will use action to mean joint-actions unless otherwise specified. We will denote the players as
i and ´i. This is to be understood as follows: if there are two players t1, 2u, when i “ 1, then
´i “ 2 and when i “ 2, ´i “ 1. The true but unknown game will be denoted as M whereas the
plausible set of games we consider at epoch k will be denoted byMk. An EBS policy in the true
gameM will be denoted by πEg and its value by VEg. If for the EBS value inM , the player with the
lowest ideal advantage value is receiving it, we will denote this player by p´ while the other player
will be p`. The EBS policy in this situation will be denoted as a˚ (it is guaranteed to be a single
joint-action).
r¯ will be used to denote empirical mean rewards and in general ¯ is used to mean a value computed
using empirical r¯. r˜ will be used to mean the rewards from the upper limit game in our plausible set,
while rˆ will be used to mean the rewards from the lower limit game in our plausible set. Also, in
general ˜ while be used to mean a value computed using r˜ and ˆ to mean a value computed using rˆ.
k will be used to denote the current epoch. Nkpaq the number of rounds action a has been played
in epoch k — Nk the number of rounds epoch k has lasted — tk the number of rounds played up
to epoch k — Ntkpaq the number of rounds action a has been played up to round tk — r¯itpaq the
empirical average rewards of player i for action a at round t. m will be used to denote the total
number of epochs up to round T .
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B Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem (1). After running Algorithm 3 in self play with δtk “ δk¨tk and ǫtk “ 2 ¨
´
|A| ln tk
tk
¯1{3
for any rounds T ě |A|, with probability at least 1´ δ4
3T
, the individual rational regret (definition 9
) for each player is upper bounded as:
RegretT ď |A|2 log2
ˆ
8T
|A|
˙
` 12 3
a
|A| lnT ¨ T 2{3 ` 2
d
2 ln
|A|T log2
8T
|A|
δ
p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T
` 2
ba
T |A|` 6`
d
T
2
¨ ln
ˆ
T
δ4
¨ 45
99.375´ π4
˙
ď O
´
12 3
a
|A| lnT ¨ T 2{3
¯
B.1 Regret analysis for the egalitarian algorithm in self-play
The proof is similar to that of UCRL2 [16] and KL-UCRL [12]. As the algorithm is divided into
epochs, we first show that the regret bound within an epoch is sub-linear. We then combine those
per-epoch regret terms to get a regret for the whole horizon simultaneously. Both of these regrets are
computed with the assumption that the true gameM is within our plausible set. We then conclude
by showing that this is indeed true with high probability. Let’s first start by decomposing the regret.
Regret decomposition Here we decompose the regret in each round k. We start by defining the
following event E,
E “ E1 _ E2 _ E3 _ E4, (6)
E1 : pπ˜k “ a˜SVkq (7)
E2 : pπ˜k “ a˜k,Egq (8)
E3 :
´
a˚ R A˜p´ ^ 2Ctkpπ˜k,Egq ď ǫtk | πEg “ a˚
¯
(9)
E4 :
´
a˚ P A˜p´ ^ π˜k “ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜ | πEg “ a˚, V p
`
` pa˚q ą V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
(10)
We have:
RegretiT “
Tÿ
t“1
V i
Eg
´ rit (11)
“
Tÿ
t“1
IE“1
`
V i
Eg
´ rit
˘` Tÿ
t“1
IE“0
`
V i
Eg
´ rit
˘
(12)
ď
Tÿ
t“1
IE“1`
Tÿ
t“1
IE“0
`
V i
Eg
´ rit
˘
(13)
In the following, we will use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the last term of Equation 13, similarly
to Section 4.1 in [16]. In particular, with probability at least 1´ δ1:
RegretiT ď
Tÿ
t“1
IE“1`
mÿ
k“1
p∆k | E “ 0q `
a
T lnp1{δ1q{2 (14)
where∆k is the regret per-epoch defined by
∆k “
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
`
V i
Eg
´ E ripaq˘ (15)
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Regret when the event E defined by (6) is False and the true Model is in our plausible set We
will now simplify the notation by using∆k, E to mean that the expression is condition on E being
False. We can thus bound∆k, E :
∆k, E ď
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
´
Vˆ ik ´ E ripaq ` 4ǫtk
¯
(16)
“
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
´
Vˆ ik ´ rˆipaq
¯
`
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
`
rˆipaq ´ E ripaq˘` 4 ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqǫtk
“
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
´
Vˆ ik ´ rˆipaq
¯
` 4
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqǫtk `
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
˜
r¯ipaq ´ E ripaq ` Crptkqa
Ntkpaq
¸
ď
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaq
´
Vˆ ik ´ rˆipaq
¯
` 4
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqǫtk `
ÿ
aPA
2CrptkqNkpaqa
Ntkpaq
(17)
ď |A|` 4
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqǫtk `
ÿ
aPA
2CrptkqNkpaqa
Ntkpaq
(18)
where Equation (16) comes from the fact that when E “ 0, Vˆ ik ě V iBR ´ 4ǫtk (See Lemma 3).
Equation (17) comes from the fact that we assumeM PMk meaning |r¯ipaq ´E ripaq| ď Crptkq?
Ntk paq
.
Equation (18) comes from the fact the egalitarian solution involves playing one joint-action with
probability wk P r0, 1s and another joint-action with probability 1 ´ wk; since it is always possible
to boundwk as
n
Nk
ď wk ď n`1Nk with n P N a non-negative integer, and by construction the players
play as close as possible to wk, then the error is bounded by
1
Nk
ď 1
Nkpaq .
We are now ready to sum up the per-epoch regret over all epochs for which the event E is false. We
have:
mÿ
k“1
∆k ď
mÿ
k“1
˜
|A|` 4
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqǫtk `
ÿ
aPA
2CrptkqNkpaqa
Ntkpaq
¸
(19)
“ m|A|` 4
mÿ
k“1
ǫtkNk `
mÿ
k“1
ÿ
aPA
2CrptkqNkpaqa
Ntkpaq
(20)
Now assuming ǫtk “ Ce ¨
´
|A| ln tk
tk
¯1{3
, we have:
mÿ
k“1
ǫtkNk “
mÿ
k“1
|A|
1{3
Ce
3
?
ln tk
t
1{3
k
Nk (21)
ď T 1{6|A|1{3Ce 3
?
lnT
mÿ
k“1
Nk?
tk
(22)
Using Appendix C.3 in [16], we can conclude that
mÿ
k“1
ǫtkNk ď T 2{3|A|1{3Ce 3
?
lnT
Similarly [16] Equation (20) shows that:
mÿ
k“1
ÿ
aPA
Nkpaqa
Ntkpaq
ď p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T
Furthermore [16] shows that:
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m ď |A| log2
ˆ
8T
|A|
˙
Combining all the above results lead to
mÿ
k“1
∆k ď |A|2 log2
ˆ
8T
|A|
˙
` 4T 2{3|A|1{3Ce 3
?
lnT ` 2max
k
Crptkqp
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T (23)
Combining with probability of failure Combining (23) with Lemma 4 bounding the num-
ber of times event E is true, together with Proposition 3 justifying the high probability from
t ě maxt3, pT |A|q1{4u, noticing that up to t “ maxt3, pT |A|q1{4u our maximum regret is
maxt6, 2pT |A|q1{4u, picking δ1 in (14) as δ1 “ δ4
T
¨
´
99.375´π4
45
¯
and usingmaxk Crptkq “ Crptmq
leads to:
RegretT ď |A|2 log2
ˆ
8T
|A|
˙
` 4T 2{3|A|1{3Ce 3
?
lnT ` 2
d
2 ln
|A|T log2
8T
|A|
δ
p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T
` 16A
1{3T 2{3 ln1{3 T
C2e
` 2
b?
TA` 6`
d
T
2
¨ ln
ˆ
T
δ4
¨ 45
99.375´ π4
˙
with a failure probability of δ
4
3T
Picking Ce “ 2 leads to the statement of Theorem 1.
Proposition 3 (Probability of Failure). If Algorithm 3 is run with the plausible set constructed with
δtk “ δk¨tk , then the probability of failure from round t “ maxt3, pT |A|q
1{4u to round T with T ě 3
is upper bounded as:
P
$’&
’%
ď
k|tkě
?
T |A|
M RMk
,/.
/- ď
δ4
T
¨
ˆ
π4 ´ 84.375
45
˙
Proof. Using Lemma 5, we know that at any epoch k, our plausible set contains the true model
with probability at least 1 ´ 2|A|δ4tk , meaning that the probability of failure is 2|A|δ4tk . We want
to combine these failure probabilities for all possible epochs (after round maxt3, pT |A|q1{4u). For
that, consider δtk “ δ¨k¨tk . Let kt the smallest round such that tkt ě maxt3, pT |A|q
1{4u. Using a
union bound (Fact 4) we have that the probability P
!Ť
k|tkěmaxt3,pT |A|q1{4uM RMk
)
up to round
T is:
P
$&
%
ď
k|tkěmaxt3,pT |A|q1{4u
M RMk
,.
- ď
mÿ
k“kt
2|A|δ4tk (24)
“
mÿ
k“kt
2|A|δ4
k4 ¨ t4k
(25)
ď 2δ
4
T
mÿ
k“kt
1
k4
(26)
“ 2δ
4
T
˜
mÿ
k“1
1
k4
´
kt´1ÿ
k“1
1
k4
¸
(27)
ď 2δ
4
T
ˆ
π4
90
´ 1´ 1
16
˙
(28)
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(28) comes from
ř8
k“1
1
k4
“ π4
90
and kt ě 3 when tkt ě 3 due to the doubling trick used in
Algorithm 3.
The following fact comes directly by construction of the Algorithm.
Fact 3 (Error on the maximin policy). For any player i and epoch k for which the true modelM is
within our plausible setMk and Event E1 defined by (7) is False, then:
2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ď ǫtk
Lemma 1 (Pessimism and Optimism of the maximin value). For any player i and epoch k for which
the true modelM is within our plausible setMk, the maximin value computed satisfies:
SV i ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ď SVˇ ik ď SV i
Proof. Pessimism of the maximin value. Let Vˆ denote the lower bound on the value through the
reward estimate r¯ ´ C and V˜ the corresponding upper bound through r¯ ` C. By definition,
π˜iSVk “ argmax
πi
min
π´i
V˜ ipπi, π´iq (29)
πˆ´iSVk “ argmin
π´i
Vˆ ipπ˜iSVk , π´iq (30)
SVˇ ik “ min
π´i
Vˆ ipπ˜iSVk , π´iq (31)
“ Vˆ ipπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (32)
As a result we have:
SV i “ max
πi
min
π´i
V ipπi, π´iq (33)
ě min
π´i
V ipπ˜iSVk , π´iq (34)
ě min
π´i
Vˆ ipπ˜iSVk , π´iq (35)
“ SVˇ ik (36)
Optimism of the maximin value We have:
SVˇ ik “ Vˆ ipπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (37)
“ V˜ ipπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (38)
ě min
π´i
V˜ ipπ˜iSVk , π´iq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (39)
“ V˜ ipπ˜iSVk , π˜´iSVkq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (40)
“ max
πi
V˜ ipπi, π˜´iSVkq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (41)
ě max
πi
V ipπi, π˜´iSVkq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (42)
ě max
πi
min
π´i
V ipπi, π´iq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (43)
“ SV i ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq (44)
(45)
Lemma 2 (Optimism of the advantage game). This lemma prove that the advantage value for any
policy π in our optimistic model is greater than in the true model. For any policy π, player i and
epoch k for which the true modelM is within our plausible setMk:
V˜ i`pπq ě V i`pπq
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Proof. First, we prove that the advantage value for any policy π in our optimistic model is greater
than in the true model. We have:
V˜ i`pπq “ V˜ ipπq ´ SVˇ ik (46)
ě V ipπq ´ SVˇ ik (47)
ě V ipπq ´ SV i (48)
“ V i`pπq (49)
where (48) comes from Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 (Optimism of the Policy computation). For any epoch k for which the true model M is
in our plausible setMk and Event E defined by (6) is False, then for any player i, we have:
Vˆ ik ě V iEg ´ 4ǫtk
Proof. Immediate by combining Lemma (10) (11), (12)
Lemma 4 (Number of times event E defined by (6) is True). After any number T of rounds for
which the true model M was in our plausible set Mk at every epochs k up to T , the number
NT pE “ Trueq of rounds for which Event E defined by (6) is True satisfy:
NT pE “ Trueq ď 16A
1{3T 2{3 ln1{3 T
C2e
Proof. The proof is an immediate consequence of combining Lemmas 6,7,8, 9.
Lemma 5 (High probability of the plausible set). At any epoch k, with probability at least 1´2|A|δ4,
the true modelM is in our plausible set constructed using (1).
Proof. This is a direct application of Hoeffding’s bound (Lemma 14) on each action individually
and then using a union bound (Fact 4) over all actions.
Lemma 6 (Number of times an action from the maximin policy is played). After any number T of
rounds for which the true model M was in our plausible set Mk at every epochs k up to T , the
numberNT pE1 “ Trueq of rounds for which event E1 defined by (7) is true satisfy:
NT pE1 “ Trueq ď 16A
1{3T 2{3 ln1{3 T
C2e
Proof. By definition, the event E1 is true when π˜k “ a˜SVk . We have:
π˜k “ a˜SVk ùñ 2Ctkpa˜SVkq ą ǫtk (50)
ùñ 2
d
2 ln tk
Ntkpa˜SVkq
ą ǫtk (51)
ùñ Ntkpa˜SVkq ă
8 ln tk
ǫ2tk
(52)
Summing over all actions, using the fact that during epoch k no action is played more than twice the
number of times it was played at the beginning of epoch k and replacing ǫtk by its value, leads to
the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 7 (Number of times event defined by (8) is True). After any number T of rounds for which
the true model M was in our plausible set Mk at every epochs k up to T , the number NT pE2 “
Trueq of rounds for which event E2 defined by (8) is true satisfy:
NT pE2 “ Trueq ď 16A
1{3T 2{3 ln1{3 T
C2e
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Proof. By definition, the event is true when π˜k “ a˜k,Eg. We have:
π˜k “ a˜k,Eg ùñ 2Ctkpa˜k,Egq ą ǫtk (53)
And the remainder of the proof follows the proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 8 (Number of times Event defined by (9) is True). After any number T of rounds for which
the true modelM was in our plausible setMk at every epochs k up to T , Event E3 defined by (9)
is always False.
Proof.
E3 “ True ùñ r˜p
´
` pa˚q ` ǫtk ă V˜ p
´
` pπ˜k,Egq (54)
ùñ r¯p´` pa˚q `
d
2 ln tk
Ntkpa˚q
` ǫtk ă V¯ p
´
` pπ˜k,Egq ` Ctkpπ˜k,Egq (55)
ùñ E rp´` pa˚q ` ǫtk ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k ă V p
´
` pπ˜k,Egq ` 2Ctkpπ˜k,Egq ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k
(56)
ùñ E rp´` pa˚q ` ǫtk ă E rp
´
` pa˚q ` ǫtk pwhich is always Falseq (57)
(54) comes from a˚ R A˜p´ (by definition)
(56) comes from (since the true model is in our plausible set)
E r
p´
` paq ´ Ctkpaq ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k ď r¯p
´
` paq ď E rp
´
` paq ` Ctkpaq ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k @a P A
(57) comes from E r
p´
` paEgq ě V p
´
` pπ˜k,Egq (since by assumption πEg “ a˚) and 2Cpπ˜k,Egq ď ǫtk
(by assumption).
Lemma 9 (Number of times Event defined by (10) is True). After any number T of rounds for
which the true model M was in our plausible set Mk at every epochs k up to T , the number
NT pE4 “ Trueq of rounds for which Event E4 defined by (10) is True satisfy:
NT pE4 “ Trueq ď 16A
1{3T 2{3 ln1{3 T
C2e
Proof. The condition E4 is: a˚ P A˜p´ ^ π˜k “ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜ | πEg “ a˚, V p
`
` pa˚q ą V p
´
` pa˚q `
2ǫtk
E4 is True ùñ r˜p
´
` pa˜p´q ě r˜p
`
` pa˜p`q (58)
ùñ r˜p´` pa˜p´q ě r˜p
`
` pa˚q (59)
ùñ r˜p´` pa˜p´q ě E rp
`
` pa˚q (60)
ùñ r˜p´` pa˜p´q ą E rp
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk (61)
ùñ E rp´` pa˜p´q ` 2Ctkpa˜p´q ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k ą E rp
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk (62)
ùñ E rp´` pa˜p´q ` 2Ctkpa˜p´q ` ǫtk ą E rp
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk (63)
ùñ 2Ctkpa˜p´q ` ǫtk ą 2ǫtk (64)
ùñ Ntkpa˜p´q ă
8 ln tk
ǫ2tk
(with π˜k “ a˜p´ ) (65)
where (58) comes (by definition of event E4) π˜k “ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜
(59) comes from (by definition of event E4) a˚ P A˜p´ and the definition of a˜p`
16
(60) comes from using Lemma 2 since the true model is in our plausible set.
(61) comes from the definition of event E4 that V
p`
` pa˚q ą V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
(62) comes from (since the true model is in our plausible set)
r¯
p´
` paq ď E rp
´
` paq ` Ctkpaq ` SV p
´ ´ SVˇ p´k @a P A
(63) comes from Lemma 1 (since the true model is in our plausible set) and Fact 3 (since Event E1
is False)
(64) comes from E r
p´
` pa˚q ě E rp
´
` pa˜p´q since πEg “ a˚
Summing over all actions, using the fact that during epoch k no action is played more than twice the
number of times it was played at the beginning of epoch k and replacing ǫtk by its value, leads to
the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 10 (Optimism of the Policy computation when egalitarian advantage is identical). For any
epoch k for which the true model M is in our plausible set Mk, the two players have the same
egalitarian advantage value in M and Event E defined by (6) is False, then for any player i, we
have:
Vˆ ik ě V iEg ´ 2ǫtk
Proof. We have:
Vˆ ik “ V˜ ipπ˜kq (66)
ě V˜ ipπ˜k,Egq ´ ǫtk (67)
“ V˜ i`pπ˜k,Egq ` SVˆ ik ´ ǫtk (68)
ě min
j
V˜
j
`pπEgq ` SVˆ ik ´ ǫtk (69)
ě min
j
V
j
`pπEgq ` SVˆ ik ´ ǫtk (70)
“ V i`pπEgq ` SVˆ ik ´ ǫtk (71)
“ V i`pπEgq ` SV i ´ SV i ` SVˆ ik ´ ǫtk (72)
“ V ipπEgq ` SVˆ ik ´ SV i ´ ǫtk (73)
ě V ipπEgq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ´ ǫtk (74)
“ V i
Eg
´ 2ǫtk (75)
(69) comes by definition of π˜k,Eg (i.e the policy maximizing the minimum advantage).
(71) comes by assumption that in the true model both players have the same egalitarian advantage.
(74) comes from Lemma 1 and (75) from Fact 3.
Lemma 11 (Optimism of the Policy computation for the player p´). For any epoch k for which
Event E defined by (6) is False, the true model M is in our plausible set Mk, one player (named
p´) is receiving its maximum egalitarian advantage value inM , then for player p´, we have:
Vˆ
p´
k ě V p
´
Eg
´ 2ǫtk
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 10 but using the fact that here, only p´ is guaranteed
to have the minimum egalitarian advantage in the true model. We have:
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Vˆ
p´
k “ V˜ p
´pπ˜kq (76)
ě V˜ p´pπ˜k,Egq ´ ǫtk (77)
“ V˜ p´` pπ˜k,Egq ` SVˆ p
´
k ´ ǫtk (78)
ě min
j
V˜
j
`pπEgq ` SVˆ p
´
k ´ ǫtk (79)
ě min
j
V
j
`pπEgq ` SVˆ p
´
k ´ ǫtk (80)
“ V p´` pπEgq ` SVˆ p
´
k ´ ǫtk (81)
“ V p´` pπEgq ` SV p
´ ´ SV p´ ` SVˆ p´k ´ ǫtk (82)
“ V p´pπEgq ` SVˆ p
´
k ´ SV p
´ ´ ǫtk (83)
ě V p´pπEgq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ´ ǫtk (84)
“ V p´
Eg
´ 2ǫtk (85)
Lemma 12 (Optimism of the Policy computation for player p`). For any epoch k for which the true
modelM is in our plausible setMk, one player (named p
´, the other is named p`) is receiving its
maximum egalitarian advantage value inM and EventE defined by (6) is False, then for player p`,
we have:
Vˆ
p`
k ě V p
`
Eg
´ 4ǫtk
Proof. First, we decompose the different cases that appear when EventE (6) is False. Then, we will
treat each cases separately.
We have:
E is False ùñ E1 is False^ E2 is False^ E3 is False^ is False (86)
ùñ π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^
´
a˚ P A˜p´ _ 2Ctkpπ˜k,Egq ą ǫtk _ πEg ‰ a˚
¯
(87)
^
´
a˚ R A˜p´ _ π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ _ πEg ‰ a˚ _ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
ùñ π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^
´
a˚ P A˜p´ _ 2Ctkpπ˜k,Egq ą ǫtk
¯
(88)
^
´
a˚ R A˜p´ _ π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ _ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
ùñ π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ (89)
^
´
a˚ R A˜p´ _ π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ _ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
ùñ π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ (90)
^
´
π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ _ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
(88) comes from the assumption that πEg “ a˚ since p´ is receiving its maximum egalitarian
advantage inM
(89) comes from the fact that by construction of the Algorithm it is impossible for π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg and
2Ctkpπ˜k,Egq ą ǫtk to be True simultaneously.
(90) comes from the fact that is it not possible to have a˚ P A˜p´ and a˚ R A˜p´ simultaneously.
Now let’s decompose π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ part of (90)
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π˜k ‰ a˜p´ _ p` R P˜ ùñ
´
π˜k ‰ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜
¯
_
´
π˜k ‰ a˜p´ ^ p` R P˜
¯
_ p` R P˜ (91)
ùñ
´
π˜k ‰ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜
¯
_ p` R P˜ (92)
Replacing (92) into (90) gives us:
E is False ùñ
´
π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ p` R P˜
¯
_
´
π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ π˜k ‰ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜
¯
(93)
_
´
π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk
¯
We will now bound the EBS value of p` for each term of (93) as a separate cases. .
Case: π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ V p
`
` pa˚q ď V p
´
` pa˚q ` 2ǫtk We have:
Vˆ
p`
k “ V˜ p
`pπ˜kq (94)
ě V˜ p`pπ˜k,Egq ´ ǫtk (95)
“ V˜ p`` pπ˜k,Egq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (96)
ě min
j
V˜
j
`pπEgq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (97)
ě min
j
V
j
`pπEgq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (98)
“ V p´` pπEgq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (99)
ě V p`` pπEgq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ 3ǫtk (100)
“ V p`` pπEgq ` SV p
` ´ SV p` ` SVˇ p`k ´ 3ǫtk (101)
“ V p`pπEgq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ SV p
` ´ 3ǫtk (102)
ě V p`pπEgq ´ 2Ctkpπ˜iSVk , πˆ´iSVkq ´ 3ǫtk (103)
“ V p`
Eg
´ 4ǫtk (104)
Case: π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ π˜k ‰ a˜p´ ^ p` P P˜
Vˆ
p`
k “ V˜ p
`pπ˜kq (105)
ě V˜ p`pa˜p`q (106)
“ V˜ p`` pa˜p`q ` SVˇ p
`
k (107)
“ max
aPA˜
p´
V˜
p`
` paq ` SVˇ p
`
k (108)
ě V˜ p`` pa˚q ` SVˇ p
`
k (109)
“ V˜ p`pa˚q ´ SVˇ p
`
k ` SVˇ p
`
k (110)
ě V p`
Eg
(111)
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Case: π˜k ‰ a˜SVk ^ π˜k ‰ a˜k,Eg ^ a˚ P A˜p´ ^ p` R P˜
Vˆ
p`
k “ V˜ p
`pπ˜kq (112)
ě V˜ p`pπ˜k,Egq ´ ǫtk (113)
“ V˜ p`` pπ˜k,Egq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (114)
ě max
aPA˜
p´
V˜
p`
` paq ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (115)
ě V˜ p`` pa˚q ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (116)
“ V˜ p`pa˚q ´ SVˇ p
`
k ` SVˇ p
`
k ´ ǫtk (117)
ě V p`pπEgq ´ ǫtk (118)
“ V p`
Eg
´ ǫtk (119)
(115) is due to the fact that since p` R P we have: maxaPA˜
p´
V˜
p`
` paq ď Vˆ p
`
` pπ˜k,Egq
Combining (104), (111), (119) leads to the statement of the Lemma.
C On the Egalitarian Bargaining solution
C.1 Achievable values for both players
Fact (1). Any achievable value V “ pV i, V ´iq for the players can be achieved by a stationary
correlated-policy.
Proof. We start by showing that values for deterministic stationary policies exists and are unique,
then we conclude by showing that any values can be achieved simultaneously for both player by a
single stationary correlated-policy.
For any player i, the value as defined by Definition 4 of any stationary policy exists and is unique
[25] since the game would be equivalent to a 1-state Markov Decision Process. As a result, the value
of deterministic stationary policies (i.e joint-actions) exists.
When player i play with a deterministic stationary policy ai and player ´i plays with a de-
terministic stationary policy a´i, the values for the two players can be visualized as a point
x “ `V ipai, a´iq, V ´ipai, a´iq˘ “ pxi, x´iq in a two-dimensional space.
Following [21], we consider the set of all pairs of (values for) deterministic policies X “
t`V ipai, a´iq, V ´ipai, a´iq˘ @ai P Ai, a´i P A´iu for the two players. All the points x P X
can be achieved as value for the two players in the repeated game, simply by repeatedly playing the
corresponding joint-action.
Consider the convex hull C of the set of points x P X . This means that any point in the convex hull
can be expressed as a weighted linear combination of the points x P X where the weights sum up
to 1. Those weights can thus be seen as probabilities which allows us to affirm that any point in
the convex hull can be achieved as values for the two players in the repeated game (by playing the
corresponding stationary policy with the weight as probabilities). On the other side, any achievable
values for the two players belongs to the convex since hull which follows from the definition of
convex hull. In conclusion, the convex hull represents exactly the set of all achievable values for
the two players. And since any point in the convex hull is achievable by a stationary policy, this
concludes our proof.
C.2 Existence and Uniqueness of the EBS value for stationary policies
Fact (2). If we are restricted to the set of stationary policies, then the EBS value defined in Definition
7 exists and is unique.
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Proof. [15] proves that the EBS value as defined in Definition 7 always exists and is unique for
any bargaining problem that is convex, closed, of non-empty Pareto frontier and non degenerate (i.e
there exists a point greater or equal than the disagreement point).
To conclude the proof of this fact, it is then enough to prove that we have a bargaining problem
satisfying those properties. We consider the bargaining problem induced by the repeated game.
Here our disagreement point is the maximin value.
From the proof of Fact 1, we can see that the repeated game with stochastic rewards can be replaced
by another one with deterministic rewards corresponding to the values of joint-actions. As a result,
the maximin value exists and is unique. Also, there always exists a unique (one-stage) Nash Equilib-
rium which is greater in value than the maximin value of both players [20]. This means that player
can always get their maximin value. So our bargaining problem is non-degenerate.
Finally, using the same convex hull as in the proof of Fact 1, we can see that the set of achievable
values is convex. This set is also closed since the joint-actions are finite and the rewards are bounded.
And there always exists one Pareto efficient policy (Any policy achieving the maximum value for
one player). This concludes the proof.
C.3 On the form of an EBS policy
Proposition (1). Given any 2 player repeated game, the EBS value can always be achieved by a
stationary policy with non-zero probability on at most two joint-actions.
Proof. Let’s recall that the EBS value maximize the minimum possible for any player and as a result
if we have a value where the minimum advantage can’t be improved anymore, then we have the EBS
value provided that we also maximize the value of the second player if possible.
Now let’s consider the convex hull defined in the proof of Fact 1. The egalitarian point will be found
on the outer boundary of the convex hull – the minimum value of any internal point can be increased
by moving to a point above it and to the right and higher minimum means higher EBS value. This
implies that the egalitarian point can be expressed by a weight vector w that has non-zero weight on
only one or two x P X , since the convex hull is a two-dimensional polygonal region bounded by
line segments.
C.4 Finding an EBS policy
Proposition (2). Let us call the ideal advantage value V i`I of a player i, the maximum advantage
that this player can achieve under the restriction that the advantage value of the other player is non-
negative. More formally: V i`I “ maxπ|V ´i` pπqě0 V
i
`pπq. The egalitarian advantage value for the
two players is exactly the same unless there exists an EBS policy that is deterministic stationary
where at least one player (necessarily including the player with the lowest ideal advantage value) is
receiving its ideal advantage value.
Proof. From proposition 1 we can achieve the EBS value by combining at most two deterministic
stationary policies. We will prove this proposition (2) for any two possible deterministic stationary
policies (by considering a repeated game with only the corresponding joint-actions available), which
immediately means that the proposition 2 is also true for the EBS value in the full repeated game.
Consider any two deterministic stationary policy of advantage values (px11, x21q, px12, x22q). We will
now show how to compute the weight w “ argmaxwminiPt1,2uw ˚ xi1 ` p1´ wqxi2.
Case 1: x11 ď x21 and x12 ď x22. This basically means that the advantage value of player 2 is
always higher or equal than that of the player 1. So the minimum is maximized by playing the
policy maximizing the value of player 1. So, w “ 0 and we have a single deterministic stationary
policy where the player with the lowest ideal advantage receives it.
Case 2: x11 ě x21 and x12 ě x22. This is essentially Case 1with the role of player 1 and 2 exchanged.
Here w “ 1.
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If both Case 1 and Case 2 do not hold, it means that for the first policy, one player receives an
advantage value strictly greater than that of the other player while the situation is reversed for the
second policy. Without loss of generality we can assume this player is 1 (if this is not the case, we
can simply switch the id of the policy) which leads to Case 3.
Case 3: x11 ą x21 and x12 ă x22 In this case, the optimal w is such that w “ x
2
2
´x1
2
px1
1
´x1
2
q`px2
2
´x2
1
q . This
weight w is clearly between the open interval s0, 1r. This means that we have exactly two distinct
policies. Plugging in the weight shows that the advantage value of both player is the same, which
completes the proof.
D Regret analysis for the safe policy against arbitrary opponents
Theorem (2). Consider a safe algorithm for player i obtained by playing the policy π˜iSVk with δtk “
δ
k¨tk . After any rounds T ě |A| against any opponent, then with probability at least 1´ δ
4
3T
, the safe
regret (definition 8) of this policy is upper-bounded by:
RegretT ď
d
8 ln
|A|T log2
8T
|A|
δ
p
?
2` 1q
a
|A|T `
b
4
?
TA` 6`
d
2T ln
ˆ
T
δ4
¨ 90
99.375´ π4
˙
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 1. However, here we don’t have to deal with the
event E defined in (6) which is thus taken to always be False.
Also, we are always optimistic (against the true maximin value when the true modelM is within our
plausible setMk) by playing policy π˜
i
SV computed in (2). Indeed, for any opponent policy π
´i,
π˜iSV “ argmax
πi
min
π´i
V˜ ipπi, π´iq (120)
V˜ pπ˜iSV , π´iq “ max
πi
min
π´i
V˜ ipπi, π´iq (121)
ě max
πi
min
π´i
V ipπi, π´iq (122)
“ SV i (123)
Note that this is not a contradiction to the upper bound in Lemma 1 since the SVˆ i mentioned in
Lemma 1 is computed using the value Vˆ (rather than V˜ ) lower than the empirical values as shown
by (4).
As a result, the corresponding ǫtk used by step (16) in the proof of Theorem 1 is 0.
Finally, the arguments justifying step (18) in the proof of Theorem 1 does not hold anymore
since we are now playing a completely random policy. Instead, we can bound the deviation ofřm
k“1
ř
aPANkpaq
´
Vˆ ik ´ rˆipaq
¯
using Chernoff-bound. Combining those remarks into the proof
of Theorem 1 leads to statement of Theorem 2.
E Proof of the Lower bounds in Theorem 3
a21 a
2
2 ¨ ¨ ¨ a2|A2|
a11 p0.5, 1q p0.5, 0.5q ¨ ¨ ¨ p0.5, 0.5q
a12 p0.5r`ǫs, 0.5r`ǫsq p0.5, 0.5q ¨ ¨ ¨ p0.5, 0.5q
...
...
... ¨ ¨ ¨ p0.5, 0.5q
a1|A1| p0.5, 0.5q p0.5, 0.5q ¨ ¨ ¨ p0.5, 0.5q
Table 2: Lower bounds example. The rewards are generated from a Bernoulli distribution whose
parameter is specified in the table. The first value in parentheses is the one for the first player while
the other is for the second player. Here, ǫ is a small constant defined in the proof.
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Theorem (3). For any algorithm Λ, any natural numbers |A1| ě 2, |A2| ě 2, T ě |A1| ˆ |A2|,
there is a general sum game with |A| “ |A1| ˆ |A2| joint-actions such that the expected individual
rational regret of Λ after T steps is at least Ω
´
T 2{3 |A|
1{3
4
¯
.
Proof. The proof is inspired by the one for bandits in Theorem 6.11 of [6]. First, we prove the
theorem for deterministic stationary algorithms. The general case then follows by a simple argument.
The main idea of the proof is to show that there exists a repeated game such that for any algorithm
the expected regret is large (where the expectation is understood with respect to the random rewards
from the repeated game).
Let the repeated games be as follows: The first player has |A1| actions while the second player has
|A2| actions. At each round, the players’ rewards are generated independently from a Bernoulli
distribution whose expectation depends on the joint-action as follows: For one action pair a˚ “
pa1i , a2jq, the rewards of the first player has expectation 12 while the second player receives 1. All
the others joint-actions yield rewards with expectation 1
2
to both players. However, we also selects
uniformly at randomone joint-action a from the set of all joint-actions expect a˚ and with probability
1
2
, we switch the expectation of that action from 1
2
to 1
2
` ǫ for both players. This selection can be
thought as having a random variable Z that selects a˚ with probability 12 and, the remaining joint-
actions with probability 1
2p|A|´1q
Let’s denote rT the sequence of all generated rewards andRT , the set of all possible sequence up
to round T Also, let Gi.,T be the sum of rewards obtained by an algorithm for player i up to round
T . Then for any (non-randomized) algorithm we have:
sup
rT PRT
pGi
T,Eg
´Gi
T,Λ
q ě E “pGi
T,Eg
´Gi
T,Λ
q‰@i P t1, 2u (124)
where the expectation on the right-hand side is with respect to the random variables rtpaq. Thus it
suffices to bound, from above, the expected regret for the randomly chosen rewards.
First Observe that for player i:
E
“
Gi
T,Eg
‰ “ ÿ
aPA
PrZ “ asE “Gi
T,Eg
|Z “ a‰ (125)
“ 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
E
“
Gi
T,Eg
|Z “ a‰
` 1
2
E
“
Gi
T,Eg
|Z “ a˚
‰
(126)
“ T
2
V i
Eg,Z“a˚
` T
2
V i
Eg,Z‰a˚
(127)
Computing the optimal EBS values for each player gives:
V 1
Eg,Z‰a˚
“ 1
2
` ǫ, V 2
Eg,Z‰a˚
“ 1
2
` ǫ, V 1
Eg,Z“a˚
“ 1
2
,V 2
Eg,Z“a˚
“ 1
As a result, we can conclude about the optimal Egalitarian gain for both agents as:
E
“
G1
T,Eg
‰ “ T
2
` T ǫ
2
(128)
E
“
G2
T,Eg
‰ “ 3T
4
` T ǫ
2
(129)
Now, we need to bound, from above the expected cumulative reward EGi
T,Λ
for an arbitrary algo-
rithm. To this end, fix a (deterministic stationary) algorithm and let It denote the joint-action it
chooses at round t. Clearly, It is determined by the sequence of rewards r “ trI1,1, . . . rIt´1,t´1u.
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Also, let Ta “
řT
t“1 IIt“a be the number of times action a is played by the algorithm. Then, writing
Ea forEr.|Z “ as, we may write
EGi
T,Λ
“ 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
EaG
i
T,Λ
` 1
2
Ea˚ G
i
T,Λ
(130)
“ 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Tÿ
t“1
ÿ
a1PA
Ea r
i
a1,t Ea IIt“a1
` 1
2
Tÿ
t“1
ÿ
a1PA
Ea˚ r
i
a1,t Ea˚ IIt“a1 (131)
“ 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Tÿ
t“1
ÿ
a1PAzta,a˚u
Ea r
i
a1,t Ea IIt“a1
` 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Tÿ
t“1
Ea r
i
a,t Ea IIt“a
` 1
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Tÿ
t“1
Ea r
i
a˚,t
Ea IIt“a˚ (132)
` 1
2
Tÿ
t“1
ÿ
a1PAza˚
Ea˚ r
i
a1,t Ea˚ IIt“a1
` 1
2
Tÿ
t“1
Ea˚ r
i
a˚,t
Ea˚ IIt“a˚
where Line (131) follows directly from [6].
So now we have
EG1Λ,T “
T
2
` ǫ
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Ea Ta (133)
EG2Λ,T “
T
2
` 1
4
Ea˚ Ta˚ `
ǫ
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Ea Ta
` 0.5
2A´ 2
ÿ
aPAza˚
Ea Ta˚ (134)
Next, we apply Lemma 13 to Ta which is a function of the rewards sequence r since the actions of
the algorithm Λ are determined by the past rewards. Since Ta P r0, T s
EarTas ď Ea˚ rTas `
T
2
b
´Ea˚rTaspln 2q lnp1 ´ 4ǫ2q
Now letting x “ řaPAza˚ Ea˚rTas and using the fact thatřaPAza˚ ?x ďaxpA´ 1q, we have:
ÿ
aPAza˚
EarTas ď x` T
2
c
xpA ´ 1q lnp1 ´ 4ǫ2q ln 1
2
(135)
Combining (135) with (133) we can bound the gain of the first agent as:
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EG1Λ,T ď
T
2
` ǫ
2A´ 2
˜
x` T
2
c
xpA´ 1q lnp1 ´ 4ǫ2q ln 1
2
¸
(136)
Similarly, combining (135) with (134) and the fact that Ta˚ `
ř
aPAza˚ Ta “ T , we can bound the
gain of the second agent as:
EG2Λ,T ď
ǫ
2A´ 2
˜
x` T
2
c
xpA ´ 1q lnp1´ 4ǫ2q ln 1
2
¸
` 3T
4
´ 1
4
x` 1
4pA´ 1qx (137)
We can now derive the lower bound for regret of the first agent by combining (136), (124), (128)
Regret1T,Λ ě
T ǫ
2
´ ǫ
2A´ 2
˜
x` T
2
c
xpA´ 1q lnp1´ 4ǫ2q ln 1
2
¸
(138)
Similarly for the second agent by combining (137), (124), (129)
Regret2T,Λ ě Regret1T,Λ `
1
4
x´ 1
4pA´ 1qx (139)
We can now derive the overall regret of the algorithm (equal to the maximum of the regret of both
agents) by looking for the x leading to the smallest maximum. Picking ǫ “ mintA1{3T´1{3,
?
0.43
2
u
and using the fact that ´ lnp1 ´ zq ď z ` z2
2
` z3
2
for z P r0, 0.43s give the lower bound of
Ω
´
T 2{3A1{3
4
¯
This concludes the proof for deterministic stationary algorithms. The extension to randomized algo-
rithms follows the same argument as in [6].
Lemma 13. Let f : tp0, 0q, p0, 1q, p1, 0q, p1, 1quT Ñ r0,M s be any function defined on rewards
sequences rT . Then for any action a P Aza˚,
EarfprT qs ď Ea˚rfprT qs`
M
2
b
´Ea˚ rfprT qspln 2q lnp1´ 4ǫ2q
Proof. Similarly to Lemma A.1 in [2] we have
EarfprT q ´ Ea˚rfprT qs ď
M
2
b
p2 ln 2qKLpPa˚ } Paq (140)
Computing the KL-divergence similarly to Lemma A.1 in [2] leads to:
KLpPa˚ } Paq “
Tÿ
t“1
Pa˚tIt “ auKL
ˆ
1
2
›››› 12 ` ǫ
˙
(141)
“ Ea˚rfprT qs
ˆ
´1
2
lnp1´ 4ǫ2q
˙
(142)
The lemma follows by combining (140) and (142)
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F Previously Known results
Lemma 14 (Chernoff-Hoeffdingbound [14]). LetX1, X2 . . . Xn be random variables with common
range r0, 1s and such that E rXt | X1, . . . Xt´1s “ µ. Then for all ǫ ě 0
P
#
nÿ
i“1
Xi ě nµ` ǫ
+
ď exp
ˆ
´2ǫ
2
n
˙
and P
#
nÿ
i“1
Xi ď nµ´ ǫ
+
ď exp
ˆ
´2ǫ
2
n
˙
Fact 4 (Union Bound also known as Boole’s inequality). For a countable set of events A1, A2, . . .
we have:
P
#ď
i
Ai
+
ď
ÿ
i
PpAiq
G Algorithms
G.1 Finding an EBS policy for a game with known rewards distribution
For any gameM with rewards r this can be done using (5) with rˆ` replaced by r`
G.2 Communication protocol
It is also important for the players to communicate since the policies of the players might need to
be correlated to play the same joint-action. This communication5 is done through lexicographical
ordering the policies using the unique actions identifier and player identifier assumed to be shared
before the game start by both players. When a policy involve playing multiple actions with different
probabilities, players simply play actions such that their empirical probability of play is as close as
possible to the true policy probability. This is explained more formally in the function PLAYp) of
Algorithm 3.
5It is possible to remove this assumption and uses more cryptographically robust synchronization protocol
with minimal communication. However, this is out of scope of this paper.
26
Algorithm 3 Generic Optimism in the face of uncertainty
Initialization:
Nkpaq denotes the number of rounds action a has been played in episode k — Nk the number
of rounds episode k has lasted — tk the number of rounds played up to episode k — Ntkpaq
the number of rounds action a has been played up to round tk — r¯
i
tpaq the empirical average
rewards of player i for action a at round t.
Let tÐ 1
Set Nk, Nkpaq, Ntkpaq to zero for all a P A.
for episodes k “ 1, 2, . . . do
tk Ð t
Ntk`1paq Ð Ntkpaq @a
rˆikpaq “ r¯ikpaq ` Ckpaq, rˇikpaq “ r¯ikpaq ´ Ckpaq @a, i with Ck as in (1).
π˜k Ð OPTIMISTICEGALITARIANPOLICYpr¯t, rˆk, rˇkq
Execute policy π˜k:
do
Let at Ð PLAYp), play it and observe rt
Nk Ð Nk ` 1 Nkpatq Ð Nkpatq ` 1 Ntk`1patq Ð Ntk`1patq ` 1
Updated r¯tpatq
tÐ t` 1
while Nkpatq ď maxt1, Ntkpaqu
end for
function PLAY
Let at the action a that minimizes
∣
∣
∣π˜kpaq ´ NkpaqNk
∣
∣
∣
Ties are broken in favor of the player with the lowest, then in favor of the lexicographically
smallest action.
return at
end function
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